THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
Duncan Kennedy*
This is an attempt to theorize the daily life of law teachers and
law students, rather than a more formal "study."' It is also an example of a kind of work I've been trying to do for a number of years. The
notion is to make explicit the political content of everyday life in the
law-the implicit or unconscious political meanings that are programmed into the "personal" and the "professional." Part of this is
trying to produce word pictures of what things are like, to evoke them
vividly. But the picture is also an interpretation. It selects some things,
rejects others, and relates the things selected outward to other realms.
In this article, I will try to relate the curriculum of a typical law
school to past events in legal education. I think I could probably
produce a footnote to back up each of my factual and historical
assertions, but I am by no means sure of it, and haven't made the
attempt. I've tried to relate the present to the past not by undertaking
research designed to answer a question about origins, but just by
rearranging in a new pattern a lot of our common knowledge (some of
it certainly false) about the way things are and were.
This piece also tries to get at the implicit politics of everyday
experience by relating law school ideas and practices to the commonplace categories of public life. I've applied terms like center-left and
center-right, liberal and conservative, to things like clinical legal education and contracts. This may seem odd. It usually doesn't even
occur to us to analyze things like curricular practice in political terms.
It may seem that we have apolitical, neutral, professional concepts,
like "educational effectiveness," that are more useful. But I'm working from the intuition that we often have quite strong agreement
about political content, but don't talk about it because it's embarrassing, or seems likely to lead to conflict, or because we couldn't be
"rigorous" about it. It is sometimes useful to bring this stuff to the
surface rather than burying it.
Yet another aspect of this kind of work is that it tries to use in
concrete, familiar settings the exotic concepts of structure and contraProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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diction, both derived from Western European "fancy theory" (structuralism, phenomenology, neo-Marxism, hermeneutics, and the like).
This is problematic because concepts from these European enterprises
usually get deployed as part of a high-flown, mystificatory Dance of
the Big Words designed more to establish the choreographer's prestige
than to communicate with the audience. I'm nonetheless convinced
that some fancy theory is just plain essential to understanding even the
most mundane details of my own life; I'd like to incorporate it into my
work, and I don't exclude the possibility that a person doing this kind
of microstudy might make a valuable contribution to that larger
theoretical enterprise.
These preoccupations make this piece representative of one of the
strands of the intellectual movement called Critical Legal Studies.
Since the mid-seventies, there has been a small but rapidly growing
group of law teachers, students, practitioners and social scientists
writing about the American legal system from a committed left perspective, using methodologies that had previously been more familiar
to literary critics and continental social philosophers than to legal
academicians. Much of the critical legal work has been historicaltracing the way elites have consciously used law to their advantage,
and, at the same time, the less conscious way legal thought works as a
whole world view in itself, reconciling people to the status quo by
making it look somehow natural and fair as well as just plain powerful. There is also a great deal of work on current doctrine that shows
the internally contradictory character of our law (e.g., civil rights
law, labor law, contract law, or torts), and how internally contradictory doctrine can passivize people by offering justice and yet denying
it at the same time.
Specifically, this piece is about the political significance of the
structure of the law school curriculum. My claim is an extremely
simple one: the private law doctrinal component of the curriculum is
politically center-right. It is balanced against a center-left part. The
center-left part lacks the monolithic character of the private law
doctrinal element. It is a collection of disparate curricular elements,
including public law (as opposed to private law), legal process, clincal
legal education, interdisciplinary studies and policy. Below is a diagram of these elements:
Public law
Policy orientation
Private law
doctrine
Interdisciplinary studies
Legal process orientation

Clinical education
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Doctrine, in its box, is at the center, a very real concrete thing.
Around it are policy, legal process, interdisciplinary studies, clinical
legal education and public law. I've drawn it this way, rather than in
an array from center-left to center-right, because a basic characteristic of the politics of legal education is the priority or primacy of
doctrine. Doctrine was there first. The other things were there afterwards. There were doctrinally oriented law teachers before there
were public law, clinical, interdisciplinary, legal process or policy
oriented law teachers. Those who identify themselves as doctrinal, as
opposed to any of the other things, usually also see themselves as
traditional rather than innovative. It's not as though there are two
positions which are equally balanced and symmetrical. Center-left
versus center-right also represents change versus continuity.
Now I am going to support my crude model by giving a description of the political content of the nondoctrinal curricular components. I will leave doctrine for last, although doctrine is temporally
first, and first in everyone's mind. I don't mean to suggest that the
nondoctrinal elements represent radicalism, or far-out leftism, as opposed to doctrine seen as reactionary. I don't see it as that kind of
opposition. I see it more nuanced-a difference within the center
rather than a polarity of political extremes. What I'll do for each
component is to give a description of it that is bifurcated, suggesting
both its centerness and its leftness. In this context, I probably represent the political extreme, since I think of myself as a socialist, and as
such, I don't situate myself anywhere on the diagram: we extremists
don't believe in it.
I am going to generalize from my experience as a student in a law
school which was profoundly committed to some of these center-left
curricular elements, and from my experience as a teacher at a school
committed to others of them. I was a student at the Yale Law School,
which was, when I was there in the late sixties, completely dominated
by the policy, interdisciplinary and public law components. Clinical
legal education was the wave of the future at the moment that I left
Yale, and Harvard Law School, where I teach now, is significantly
influenced by the clinical movement and by the legal process approach, although it has a much more significant core of teachers who
identify themselves with private law doctrine than the Yale Law
School does.
To begin, a public law orientation is center-left. Public law
consists of constitutional law, the law of taxation, criminal law, the
set of regulatory disciplines, and administrative law. Now, regulatory
and administrative law came into existence as a result of the creation
of the regulatory welfare state. There was no meaningful body of
administrative law in any of the English-speaking countries until the
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creation of the welfare state, with its public assistance programs and
its manifold different modes of intervention in economic life. That
body of law is inseparably connected with nineteenth and twentieth
century left-wing, or center-left, or Disraeli right-wing proposals to
reform the laissez-faire state.
If you take administrative law, labor law, antitrust law, the law
of public utilities and taxation together, those bodies of law directly
embody the goal of changing the status quo through legislative programs. The same cannot be said for constitutional law. But if you look
at the history of that discipline, you'll find that it came into existence-in academia-aspart of the critique of right-wing invalidation
of leftist social legislation, and is sustained today by nostalgia for the
Warren Court.
Of course, the way I've just described it puts too much emphasis
on the left and not enough on the center character of public law
scholarship and the public law focus. That might have been accurate
for the United States in the 1930's. There weren't any courses in
taxation in American law schools until after the First World War.
There certainly were no courses in labor law, no courses in antitrust,
no courses in administrative law. Those courses were made part of the
curriculum, between about 1930 and about 1950, openly and explicitly by young liberal faculty members who thought that they were an
enormously important part of the curriculum for the simple reason
that they embodied the new wave of social legislation.
By now, that's different. Now, a large number of the people
teaching those courses, who are responsible for the vitality of the
public law curriculum, are people who see the regulatory and redistributive programs of the welfare state as having gone plenty far
enough. They accept them, but are now concerned with how to
constrict them. That's the center, as opposed to the left component of
the program. For example, very few people in the United States teach
labor law who believe that the National Labor Relations Act should
be repealed. In fact, I don't think there are any. You never read an
article by a labor lawyer advocating rolling back to the situation of
American labor legislation in 1929, before the Depression. On the
other hand, there are now many labor law teachers who see the
expansive interpretation of the Act up to, say, 1955 as having been the
appropriate high water mark, and regard everything that has happened since then as going too far. They would advocate a marginal
cutting back, and certainly oppose further expansion.
The same thing is true for antitrust. You will not find antitrust
professors who believe in the repeal of the Sherman Act, though there
are many antitrust professors today who believe that the interpreta-
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tion of antitrust law should be constricted rather than expanded.
That's what I would call a center position, as opposed to the position
of a clean conservative, who would argue that that stuff should be
done away with immediately, that we ought to go back to an unregulated market system.
So public law is both center and left; it has a distinct political
connotation. There is an association between belief in this kind of
orientation for legal education and a particular kind of political vision. The same is true of the notion of interdisciplinary studies.
The interdisciplinary focus is associated with two kinds of critiques. In the history of the interdisciplinary approach, a crucial
initial activity was demonstrating that the law in action was different
from the law in books. The notion was to do a study, using social
science techniques, showing that the picture of the economic and
social world presented by doctrine, say freedom of contract, was very
different from the way things were in real life, where poor people had
no freedom of contract and had to take what they could get. Again,
the historical origins of law-and-x are impeccably left wing. There
were no law-and-x interdisciplinary studies in the United States, at
least before the First World War, which were not motivated by a
populist or progressive or reform legislative spirit.
Moreover, during the whole period of development of law-and-x,
new law-and-x stuff was constantly produced by liberal reformers
attempting to justify the implementation of the public law program
I've already described. Law in action versus law in books was one
thing, and the other was the legislative feasibility or implementation
kind of study. Law-and-x meant that after demonstrating that the real
world was not like the picture of doctrine, you did a study to show
which particular legislative program of reform ought to be instituted.
It was an appeal to social science to justify the public law reform
program.
Now, again, what was initially left is now often center. The
interdisciplinary movement long since achieved a kind of ideological
balance, so that within it there is now a conservative form of law and
economics which is actually stronger than liberal law and economics.
There is a conservative law and sociology for dealing with criminology
and sentencing, for example. The old deterrence theory is back in the
form of law and social science. Whereas once law-and-x was unmistakably a left of center phenomenon, now it is sometimes a right of
center phenomenon. Moreover, many of the post-1945 generation of
interdisciplinary scholars have gradually drifted from the left into the
center, and no new left generation has arisen to take their place. It has
balanced out. But it still has a pedigree. It still has an historical origin.
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With the exception of the University of Chicago, law faculties putting
a lot of emphasis on interdisciplinary stuff tend to be liberal in political orientation.
The legal process orientation emphasizes the distinct roles and
the interaction of different kinds of legal institutions, and the actual
behavior (as opposed to formal prescriptions) of officials and private
parties within a given institution. That's a rough definition. The best
2
known formulation is the Hart & Sacks Legal Process Materials,
published in 1958. Hart was working on it in the late thirties, as was
Willard Hurst, who put out a similar set of materials with Wisconsin
colleagues. 3
The initial motive of the legal process orientation was to show
that courts, legislatures, administrative agencies and executive officers, along with private parties, all had appropriate roles to play in a
global scheme of organizing state policy to maximize social welfare.
That's the historical origin of the approach. It was a way of counteracting the notion that courts were completely different from legislatures and administrative agencies, the notion that administrative
agencies were basically no good and that the judges ought to hold out
against and sabotage the New Deal reform legislation because it was
incompatible with the rule of law.
So the legal process orientation was initially designed to show
that there is a role for each legal institution in a global overall plan to
maximize welfare through reform, and that the courts should cooperate with rather than obstruct that program. That idea was once really
quite left. But it has long since become totally centrist. It is much
more likely today, in the United States, that the legal process approach will be invoked in order to justify a court not doing something
left-wing, on the grounds that to do the left-wing thing would be to
disregard the appropriate limits on the judicial role. The argument
will be that, if we look at the legal process as a whole, we will see that
the left-wing thing should be done by some nonjudicial institution, if
it should be done at all. The separation of powers has been reborn
inside the legal process orientation in the United States.
Clinical education is easier because it's more recent. It has a
specific political origin in the late sixties, when it was supposed to

2 H. HART & A. SACKS, TnE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958).
' C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON, W. HURST & S. MERMIN, TIlE LEGAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

(1961).
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promote two explicitly left of center experiences. One was direct
experience by middle-class professional students of the actual life of
the poor. The organization of clinical legal education in the form of
delivery of legal services to low-income clients was meant to and did
produce a very striking political discontinuity in the lives of middleclass law students. The other aspect was that the programs were
designed to and did expose middle-class law students to aspects of the
structure of their profession, and of the hypocrisy of the bar, that they
would not otherwise experience, at least in law school.
The idea was to take the students out of the idealized law school
context, where they couldn't possibly understand what life is like, and
expose them to life at the bottom. This was supposed to teach them
that they were in danger of being sucked into a conservative and
profoundly immoral structure of delivery of legal services, biased in
favor of the rich and against the poor, and shot through with ethical
bad stuff.
Now that aspect of the clinical program is beginning to dissipate.
In just ten or twelve years, a centrist version of clinical legal education
has emerged which is purged of almost all those aspects. As it becomes
skills training and deemphasizes the legal clinic in favor of simulation,
it is moving towards a politically more moderate, calm, and centrist
picture of what it can do and what it ought to do. It's drawn back
from the political implications of the way that it was initially set up.
So there is a center-left aspect of that as well.
Finally, there is what I called the policy orientation. It's a different kind of thing than the others because it operates not as an alternative to the private law doctrinal curriculum, but as an alternative
within the doctrinal areas. It's different from the straight doctrinal
orientation in two ways. First, it constantly and critically asks the
purposes of rules: what are these rules good for? It usually asks that in
terms of some general utilitarian or social welfare perspective. What
social purpose is served by this rule?
Again, the origins of the policy approach were by no means
neutral. The policy approach was invented by people looking at the
rules of the laissez-faire state, the late nineteenth century structure of
rules, and saying, "These rules are being accepted as just, inevitable
and necessary and good, when in fact they are none of those things."
If we start questioning why they are there, and what they are good
for, we are quickly going to come to the conclusion that many of them
are not nearly as good as they look.
The other aspect of the policy approach is disintegration. Every
rule is looked at in terms of the total complex of factors that might
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make it a good rule or a bad rule. It's against doctrinal integration and
in favor of "every tub on its own bottom"-the localized policy calculus in which every aspect that might be relevant is brought to bear.
That was also originally a left-wing notion. It was the notion that
rather than a single monolithic structure of legal rules that were
necessary, logical, and just, there were thousands of discrete, particular policy choices. The belief was that administrative agencies and
legislatures should look at social problems as they arose, and deal with
each one pragmatically, with no regard to general ideological principles like "no government intervention."
It was not socialism that was behind policy. It was moderate,
center-left, ad hoc reformism, and both its utilitarianism and its
disintegrated, ad hoc quality were connected to that political program. But it has lost even that political orientation. There is now
policy analysis of every possible stripe, and it has gradually become
clear that a skillful person using the policy approach can generate a
resoundingly convincing policy rationale for any rule. There is no
existing rule that cannot be legitimated by reference to some set of
social policies.
If you're good at this kind of analysis you can actually feel your
own ambivalent, switch hitting, go-any-direction capacity. Policy can
be used to show that every rule is necessary, should be the way it is,
has been the way it is for a good reason, or it can be used to show that
any part or even the whole system should be junked. The feeling that
policy analysis is highly determinate is gone, so now it's available to
everyone rather than being left in any meaningful sense.
Now that's a set of claims about the political character of public
law, interdisciplinary study, legal process, clinical education and policy orientation. But what about the political character of doctrine?
The reason why I identify doctrine as the center-right is this: The
basic notion about doctrine among law teachers seems to be that
doctrine is, in essence, contracts, property, and torts, and that to
teach doctrine is to show that contracts, property, and torts have a
deep logical coherence as common law subjects. That they are highly
rational. Now, remember that the rules of contract, property, and
tort do not include administrative law, municipal law, welfare law,
environmental law, labor law, antitrust law, securities regulation
law. All those have been spun out-consumer protection, the law of
the health system-all have been spun out into public law.
What's left of doctrine, what we think of as doctrine, is the
common law as it existed in 1890. What is doctrine? Doctrine consists
of notions like: "The institution of private property is a good, necessary, reflection of our rights." If you have a private property system
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you have to have some rules about particular aspects of private property. Those are rules about what is a trespass, about conveying things.
You have rules of freedom of contract; you have tort rules emphasizing that people should not have to pay if they aren't negligent, and
emphasizing defenses within tort.
That body of rules is, in fact, not doctrine in any abstract sense.
It is what is left, on its last legs, of the specific body of doctrines that
defined nineteenth century laissez-faire capitalism. So doctrine has a
political connotation in the simplest possible way. The doctrines that
we talk about when we talk about doctrine are basically the doctrines
of freedom of contract, sanctity of private property, limitation of tort
liability, and the existence of many tort excuses. So it's not surprising
that doctrine is understood to be center-right as opposed to center-left.
The very process of the growth of public law, interdisciplinary study,
legal process, clinical, and policy stuff confirms the conservative character of doctrine. They are kept separate in part because they are seen
as politically incompatible with doctrine.
Of course, doctrine was once everything. What has happened is
that doctrine has shrunk from being everything to being the little
block in the middle of my diagram. One can see it either as the
addition of a periphery to the doctrinal core, or as the spinning off of
elements of the core to form the periphery. But it's very important
that belief in doctrine as rational and coherent is tantamount to belief
in the basic institutions of capitalism as rational and coherent. To
assert that property, contract and torts are rational is to assert that
you can understand capitalism as rational, that you can understand as
rational a system which is based strictly on private property, free
exchange, and the sharp limitation of all kinds of collective or communal duties of people vis- -vis one another.
As long as it doesn't claim to englobe everything, doctrine is not
extreme right. People who teach doctrine usually begin by saying,
"Well, I completely accept that the labor contract is not part of
contracts, and I completely accept that landlord/tenant is not part of
contracts." There is a thorough acceptance that the core of doctrine is
not a blueprint for a return to 1850. There is no clock-rolling-back
program implicit in teaching doctrine. It's just the affirmance that in
essence we have a capitalist system, The system is modified and
softened by all the stuff in the periphery.
My basic argument is that this political conflict, the conflict
between doctrine as center-right, and the periphery as center-left, is
rendered unreal, and its outcome distorted, by the way in which we
tend to construct the opposition. We construct this opposition between the doctrinal core and the periphery. We don't do it as center-
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left versus center-right, we do it as core versus periphery. Implicit in
choosing to do it this way is a structure of feelings about the two
opposed domains.
Here is how I'd characterize the structure of feelings. The core is
hard, the periphery is soft. The core is law, the periphery is politics.
The core is reason, the periphery is emotion. The core is based on the
clean, anti-emotional logic of doctrine, whereas the clinical, interdisciplinary, legal process, policy, and public law approaches are all
based on altruistic passion. Logic versus subjectivity. The core equals
reality. It is the way things really are, whereas the periphery is the
ideal, the way we would like things to be. There is a sense in which
the core is our real self and the periphery is our fantasy self, our
ethical fantasy self. The core is law.
There are lots of other characterizations. The core is cold, the
periphery is warm. The core is individualist, the periphery is collective or communal. The core is based on the notion that "it is my
property and if I don't want to give you any of it, I'm not going to give
you any of it. You can starve in the snow, and I will not raise a hand,
because there is no duty to act in Anglo-Commonwealth tort law, at
least in the absence of a special relationship. And that means I can let
you die." Maybe this perspective has been tempered by statute, but if
so, the change has been effected through the legislative process, and
what was once a part of the doctrinal core now belongs out in the
periphery. It's become an aspect of public law.
Significantly, the core of doctrine is unitary. There is a deep
coherence to contracts, property and torts, whereas the periphery, as
the name suggests, is dispersed, disintegrated, and chaotic. It's even
true that each element of the periphery is internally dispersed, disintegrated and chaotic. What is the unity to public law? There is none. I
asked a friend, what is public law? He said, "If the state is a party, it's
public law." Some definition! A purely formal definition. What's
private law? Private law is property, contract and tort. It's capitalism.
It is unitary. What is policy? Policy is just what's relevant to whatever
decision you happen to be making. Every tub is on its own bottom. So
it's also utterly disintegrated.
Finally, doctrine is the domain of necessity. When you are within
the logic of contract or the logic of the negligence system, you are in a.
domain in which there are premises and principles. There is a reasoning process which is legal. There is an outcome, and that outcome is
correct legally, irrespective of whether it is right or wrong ethically.
Viewed from this perspective, law becomes a necessity machine. Being good at law is being good at operating the machine. If you are a
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student, you constantly make mistakes and are corrected by a person
who operates it better than you do. That's natural, within the domain
of necessity.
The periphery, of course, is the domain of choice, of pluralism.
Anybody can believe what they want to. It would be totalitarian and
dictatorial to try to teach people what our public law programs ought
to be, what policy is best. The periphery is the area of open texture, of
freedom as opposed to necessity. Because it's "inherently subjective,"
it can't be necessary.
Now, if that's the way you construct the opposition, it's obvious
who is going to win at every level. The center-right beats the centerleft every time, when the politics of legal education are constructed in
this fashion. It may be that that's good. As an outsider to the quarrel,
I take no sides as between the center-left and the center-right. But I
would like to point out that the game is stacked when it is constructed
in this way. If it's constructed this way, it's impossible for the centerleft to maintain its initial head start, based on its correspondence to
many lay attitudes, from the first year into the second and thid years.
It is a natural and virtually inevitable consequence that students drift
from the periphery into the core.
A second kind of consequence is that the center-left position,
because it is dispersed, disintegrated, disorganized, because it has no
theme and denies its own political character, has nothing except the
vaguest kind of critique of the core. The core has a very specific and
bureaucratically appropriate thing to say to the periphery, which is,
"What are you doing? I mean, we are a law school. We are trying to
train people to do things. We have some concrete social goals to
accomplish. And you are just blithering around the periphery."
The periphery responds to the core, "But there is something
irrelevant about doctrine." So the response comes back, "What do you
mean there is something irrelevant about doctrine? The bar lives on
doctrine. It doesn't live on public law. It lives on doctrine." The
attitude toward clinical legal education is similar; "It's fine if it's skills
oriented, but the last thing we are geared to do is to train people to
believe that the social system is unjust to the poor and that the bar is
hypocritical. That's not our role."
There is no equivalent attack on the doctrinal core. It seems to be
mildly conservative. It seems to be associated with people who are
mildly conservative. But there is a distinct imbalance, because the
periphery looks nonneutral, political, crazy, ineffective and unfunded. It doesn't fare well against the core. The last straw is that,
given the way everyone agrees to construct the situation, the advo-
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cates of the periphery are full of second thoughts and insecurities.
Almost everyone teaching in the periphery believes that doctrine is
terribly important, but people who are deeply involved in doctrine
often feel that the periphery is unimportant. It's only the center-left
that feels profoundly ambivalent about its own role.
The ambivalence is related to the characteristics of doctrine as we
construct it. Doctrine is rigorous. Doctrine is analytically sound. Doctrine is careful. Doctrine requires sharp insight, the control of one's
emotions, enormous intellectual depth, and effectiveness. The periphery requires a warm heart, a certain amount of gushy willingness to
take risks, and general niceness. It is associated with woolyheadedness
and general intellectual incompetence, let's face it, in the minds of the
very people who do it. And also in the minds of people who do
doctrine.
I want to argue that this is all wrong, that this is a wrong
construction of the legal universe. It really doesn't look like my first
diagram, but rather like this:
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The two important aspects of this second diagram are the internal
contradictions of doctrine and the total fusion of the periphery with
the core. The notion is that there are two flaws in my initial diagram.
The first is that doctrine is not in fact unitary, coherent, or rational.
Doctrine does not have the qualities ascribed to it. Second, the periphery is not disintegrated, open-textured, radically less necessitarian and
more pluralistic than the core; indeed, the distinction between the
core and the periphery is an illusion.
Let me start with the claim that doctrine is unitary. Until now I
have given no real description of doctrine except to say that its essence
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is contracts, property and torts. When one says that doctrine is unitary, necessary, rigorous, logical, rational, and then considers doctrinal teaching as actually practiced, it's at first quite difficult to put the
image together with reality. A classroom everyone identifies as overtly
doctrinal seems to differ from a peripheral classroom in only three
ways.
First, such a classroom puts more emphasis than a peripheral
classroom on the memorization of a list of rules. That is, the total
number of rule units the student absorbs is greater. Second, a doctrinal class spends more time than a peripheral class testing the verbal
limitations of the rule form. The teacher puts a rule out for examination, and then formulates a series of hypotheticals whose purpose is to
demonstrate that there is a naive and a sophisticated reading of the
rule.
A naive reading of the rule will lead the student to apply it where
it shouldn't be applied and not to apply it where it should be applied.
A sophisticated understanding, after examining these hypotheticals,
leads one to the conclusion, "Gee, they can't quite mean that. You
have to apply the rules this way to make any sense at all. That
application is just crazy." This is done by the Socratic method. That's
the second aspect of a doctrinal classroom. The irony is that the naive
reading generally turns out to be "formalistic," and the sophisticated
reading generally turns out to be "guided by policy." The contrast
with the peripheral classroom turns out to be ephemeral, if we look
only at the intellectual content of what's happening.
The third aspect is the most complicated and important, yet the
least explicit. It's hard to get at. A well run doctrinal classroom offers
a one or two sentence, tag-like, formulaic justification for every rule,
and never, except for anomalies, rejects a rule. In a well run doctrinal
classroom, eighty percent of the rules come with a simple label attached: "This rule is necessary for security of transaction" or, "This
rule is necessary to guarantee commercial flexibility."
Now you might think that those two rules, with their apparently
opposite justifications, each of which is, of course, a "policy," are
going to contradict each other. But no. One rule is necessary for
security of transaction, the other for flexibility. Then there will be
some rules that are historical anomalies. "This rule is bad because it is
an historical anomaly." That's one kind of anomaly. The other kind of
anomaly is the borderline of policy. "We have finished our hard
discussion," says the teacher. "Now we've gotten to this rule, and
some people say one thing about it, some people say another thing.
Your view is as good as mine. Let's discuss it in an open-textured
way." Those are also anomalies. Rules that are on the cutting edge are
anomalous and historical artifacts are anomalous.
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That's the structure of the rule system. Eighty percent one-sentence tag, ten percent bad historical anomalies, ten percent open to
discussion as the law of the future, about which you can think anything you want. That structure is incredibly, powerfully legitimating.
It doesn't say all the rules are right. Just eighty percent. There is a
reason for every rule, and the reasons flow along. You get used to
picking them up. You write them down. They are very short. They
are never looked at in too great depth. One rule is never compared to
another rule except as a way of showing that it's consistent with
another rule. Except again for the few anomalies. The formulaic,
brief character of the justificatory tags for the rules gives you a sense
that it has all been decided long, long ago; it's all incredibly well
worked out; everyone agrees that it's all basically sewn together.
My argument is simply that this appearance of rationality is pure
illusion. I'm making a direct attack on doctrine as it is taught. Teachers give a phony impression of logical coherence, not on purpose, but
out of the tradition of teaching. The tradition of teaching sets the
teacher up with a tag for every rule, and the succession of tags gives
the teacher and the students the sense of necessity, the sense of logic,
the sense of unfolding rationality that then distinguishes the doctrinal
core from the periphery.
My claim is that in reality there are two streams of doctrine
within the doctrinal core, that the two streams are contradictory, and
that we all know it. Lord Denning' is a walking symbol of doctrinal
fractiousness, the very spirit of contradiction. The only reason he isn't
seen as challenging the whole Anglo-Commonwealth conception of
doctrine is that he is so flip. He comes across as disorganized, vague,
offhand, rather than as theoretically challenging. He gives so few
reasons. For example, in one case he explained a fundamental change
in contract damage rules by saying that any other views than his were
out of date. That's all he said.
I would say that the reason why someone like Lord Denning
doesn't develop a picture of doctrine as internally contradictory is
obvious. It's not in his interest as a law reformer to develop systemic
contradiction as the core of the private law system. He doesn't want to
delegitimate the system. He wants to change it while preserving its
legitimacy. He obviously understands it completely. It's implicit in his
activity that there aren't any principles of the type that you come to
believe there are when you sit in a doctrinal classroom listening to the
tags flow one after the other.
I

Lord Denning is The Master of the Rolls, English Court of Appeal.

1983]

LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

And Lord Denning is right. There aren't any such principles. In
contract law, for example, there are two principles: there is a reliance, solidarity, joint enterprise concept, and there is a hands-off,
arms length, expectancy-oriented, "no flexibility and no excuses" orientation. They can be developed very coherently, but only if one
accepts that they are inconsistent. There are fifteen or twenty contract
doctrines about which there is a conflict. There are two sides.
It isn't random. You can predict from a person's position on one
issue what his position is likely (not certain) to be on the next. People
who favor liberalization of excuses in contract law also tend to favor
relaxing obstacles to contract formation. They want to make it easier
to get in and easier to get out. They oppose the behavior of the person
who says, "Who, me? No contract, never saw you, never heard of you
before," after elaborate reliance. And they also oppose the person who
says, "My pound of flesh." There is a common communal, collectivist,
ethical, altruist notion that animates both notions: that you don't
simply back out of an agreement, and that you don't exact the pound
of flesh. On the other side, there is an individualist, autonomy-oriented notion of self-reliance, that people should look out for themselves, an anti-sloppiness notion. It is a powerful ethical counter-ideal
within doctrine.
That is the structure of contract doctrine, and it's typical. Doctrine is not consistent or coherent. The outcomes of these conflicts
form a patchwork, rather than following straight lines. There is no
coherence to either contracts or property or torts. Sometimes one
approach pushes all the way so that the armies get to a certain point
...and then there will be a case in which the opposing armies make it
all the way back in their counterattack. It's a battle between contradictory world views which are inside each person as well as embodied
in the litigants.
The conventional concept of doctrine is just wrong, and the minute one recognizes that, by splitting doctrine down the middle, the
distinction between core and periphery dissolves. The reason for this is
that the only way to understand what links together fifteen Lord
Denning contract opinions and fifteen of his tort opinions is to go out
to interdisciplinary studies, legal process, public law, policy and clinical perspectives. The opposition within doctrine is simply incomprehensible and unintelligible without reference to those things that are
supposed to be on the periphery.
You can't teach the contradictions of private law theory without
teaching that there are two opposed "interdisciplinary" economic
theories-theories of economic growth. There is a theory that empha-

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

sizes utter deregulation of everything, and a theory that urges people
to take externalities into account as much as possible, and therefore
leads to the rapid collectivization of investment. There are two opposed economicses. Legal process is the same thing. There are opposed
legal process theories. One emphasizes the allocation to each institution of its role, and keeping each institution within its role at all costs,
so that the rationality of the system becomes the rationality of separate
parts doing the right thing. Then there is an opposing process concept
of coordination of roles, in which the parts are trained to and ought to
respond to each other's failings, as opposed to continuing mechanically to do what they were supposed to do before.
We could go through a similar exercise for policy, public law,
and clinical. The point is that each is internally divided. Each can be
seen as a locus of conflict. This means that the impression of freedom,
subjectivity, open-texture, looseness or arbitrariness-all these characterizations of the periphery-are also false. The doctrinal core is not
unitary, and the periphery is not diffuse. They have the same, essentially dualistic structure, the structure of contradiction.
In this picture there is neither unity nor chaos; only violent
contradiction. There are no overall unifying principles of law which
make legal reasoning different from other kinds of reasoning and give
the subject an internal necessity. There is none of that. On the other
hand, legal reasoning is not just sprayed all over the map. There is a
deep level of order and structure to the oppositions between competing conceptions of doctrine and of policy and of everything else. The
task of doctrinal teaching in the first year should be to make these
underlying structures accessible to students, while at the same time
confronting them with the inescapable necessity to choose for themselves how to resolve the contradictions as they arise in their own lives.

